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PROOF OF THE CORPUS DELICTI IN ARSON CASES*
Because of the fear of convicting men for
non-existent crimes,1 the courts have long in-
sisted on clear proof of the corpus delicti-
the fact that a crime has been committed.
2
However, it is often very difficult to find
evidence of the corpus delicti of arson, because
the arsonist usually choses the time of per-
petration that insures the greatest secrecy and
much of the evidence of an intentional fire is
destroyed by the flames. Besides the problems
of discovering evidence, the prosecution may
encounter substantial obstacles in the presenta-
tion of proof in court.3 Several limitations
upon the type of evidence and conduct of the
trial, that would apply particularly to the
proof of the corpus delicti, have been con-
sidered by the courts in addition to the usual
rules of evidence. While the courts have recog-
nized the practical problems in establishing
* In the preparation of this paper, valuable as-
sistance was obtained from Mr. William C. Braun,
Chief Special Agent of the National Board of Fire
Underwriters, Chicago, Illinois, and from Dr. Rich-
ard C. Steinmetz, Chief Special Agent of the Mutual
Investigation Bureau, Chicago.
I The first judicial expression of this fear is gen-
erally attributed to Lord Hale. 2 HALE, PLEAs Or
= CRoWN 290 (1736).
2 Presumably the accused need not offer evidence
in defense until the corpus delicti is established.
State v. Levesque, 146 Me. 351, 81 A.2d 665 (1951).
3 For a general review of the technique of pre-
senting an arson case, see Cohen, Convicting the
Arsonist, 38 J. Cpne. L. & CRimoLoGY 286 (1948).
the crime of arson, there is considerable doubt
about the type of evidence that is legally com-
petent proof of the corpus delicti, and the
extent to which special restrictions are applied.
DEFINITION OF CoRpus DELICI
Most courts define the corpus delicti in
terms of the two elements necessary to show
that there has been a crime: the "legal injury"
and the "criminal agency."4 Legal injury is
the loss that the law seeks to prevent, such as
death, appropriation of property, or burning of
property; criminal agency is the fact that
the loss was caused by the criminal acts of
some person. A few courts limit their defini-
tion to the legal injury,5 but this does not wholly
4 WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2072 n.3 (3d ed. 1940);
20 AM. JuR., EvmENcE § 151. In applying the con-
cept of corpus delicti, three reasons for dismissal
must be distinguished: (a) when the conduct charged
would have been a crime, but the evidence is not
sufficient to support the charge; (b) when the con-
duct charged and proved does not amount to a
crime under the law; (c) when the charge was suffi-
cient, but the evidence does not identify the accused
as the perpetrator. While "dismissal for lack of the
corpus delicti" might apply equally to the first two
situations, the term corpus delicti is nearly always
used to describe the former-failure of proof of
action that would have fit within the definition of
the crime. For the difficulty this creates when the
crime is hard to define, see Note, Corpus Dedicti and
Criminal Negligence, 8 Ga. B. J. 326 (1946).
- State v. Wenger, 47 Wyo. 401, 38 P. 2d 339
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fulfill the purpose of the corpus delicti concept
since it does not protect men charged with
crimes when actual losses occurred without
criminal conduct. Some judges have suggested
that the guilt of the accused is an element of
the corpus delicti,6 but this makes the defini-
tion too broad. It does not describe the par-
ticular failure of proof-lack of evidence of a
crime.
The specific facts necessary to prove the
corpus delicti vary with the definition of each
crime.' At common law, the crime of arson
was defined as the wilfull and malicious burn-
ing of the house of another," but this has been
expanded in all jurisdictions by statutes and
decisions. Thus, in most states, to establish
the corpus delicti of arson the proof must
show? (a) that there has been a burning of a
structure or property protected by law, (b)
and that the fire resulted from the criminal
acts of some person.
PROOF OF THE CoRPus DELIcTr AND THE
GENERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Burden of Proof. Proving the legal injury in
arson cases ordinarily does not present many
problems. The occurrence is frequently common
knowledge in the neighborhood and receives
notice in public records and newspapers. The
great difficulty revolves around establishing
that the fire was intentionally set-the criminal
agency. The normal problem of obtaining
(1934). This is the "orthodox view" dating back to
Captain Green's Trial, [1705] Howell St. Tr. 1199,
1246. Dean Wigmore preferred this rule. 7 WiemoMo,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 401.
6 This view has been voiced only in Missouri.
State v. Joy, 315 Mo. 19, 285 S.W. 489, 494 (1926).
But repudiated there. State v. Hawkins, 165 S.W.2d
644 (Mo. 1942).
7 See discussion, supra note 4.
8 CURTISS, THE LAW oF ARSON § 1 (1936); CLARK,
CRIMINAL LAW § 88-90 (3d ed. 1915).
9 Most jurisdictions include both the legal injury
and criminal agency in the definition of the corpus
delicti of arson. People v. Fitzpatrick, 359 Ill. 363,
194 N.E. 545 (1935); 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2072
n.6 (3d ed. 1941); But some jurisdictions limit the
corpus delicti to the legal injury, supra note 5.
evidence is complicated by the legal presump-
tion that all fires start either by accident or
by natural causes." The prosecution must
persuade the judge that there is sufficient
evidence of an incendiary burning to overcome
this presumption and to warrant submission
to the jury." While there has been a good
deal of loose judicial language in this area, it
is clear that the jury must be convinced of
the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. 2
Rebutting the Presumption. Unless the cause
of the fire is particularly clear, the first step in
proving the corpus delicti of arson should be
to introduce evidence that eliminates the
possibility of accidental origin." For example,
it must be shown that the fire did not start
from faulty electrical wiring, furnaces, gas
ranges or other appliances.14 This can be estab-
lished by the use of evidence concerning the con-
dition of these appliances before the fire, the
results of later examination, or by showing
that the fire did not start near these danger
spots. Strong evidence against an accidental
burning may be developed by showing the
precautions taken by the owner to avoid loss
by fire.1" The possibility of spontaneous com-
10 State v. Alward, 354 Ill. 357, 188 N.E. 425
(1933); Williams v. State, 90 Ind. App. 667, 169
N.E. 698 (1930); CURTISS, op. cit. sutpra note 8,
§ 282 n.5.
11 There must be sufficient evidence to satisfy the
trial judge that a jury, acting under proper instruc-
tions, could reasonably find that the defendant
participated in the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 355 and 363
(12th ed. 1932). Occasionally courts announce that
there need only be "clear and cogent" or "prima
facia" proof of the corpus delicti. Comment, The
Corpus Delicti-Confession Problem, 43 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 214, 215 (1952). An examination -of
these cases indicates that these are merely the stand-
ard for judicial review of the evidence, supra note 11,
or the degree of corroboration necessary to support
or admit confessions, infra notes 58 and 61.
13 Reasonable doubt as to the incendiary origin
of the fire may be created by establishing the pres-
ence of a faulty appliance. State v. Delaney, 92
Iowa 467, 61 N.W. 189 (1894).
14 Supra note 13.
"State v. McMahon, 17 Nev. 365, 30 Pac. 1000
(1883).
[Vol. 45
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bustion may be rebutted by establishing that
inflammables were not kept in the building.
It may even be necessary to prove that the
building was not struck by lightning, if the
fire occurred during a severe stormj 6
Relevant Evidence. The prosecution must do
more than show that the fire did not start in
some of the ways in which accidental fires
normally occur; it must prove that the fire was
in fact intentionally set. The corpus delicti
of arson may generally be established by any
evidence that satisfies the standard of legal
relevancy. Ordinarily this includes all facts
that tend to demonstrate the fire was ignited
by design. Sometimes, however, logically
relevant proof is excluded because it is too
prejudicial to the accused or unduly confuses
the issues when compared with its probative
value.17 Thus testimony that the defendant
made an unusual purchase of kerosene may
indicate that he planned the fire, but this
evidence may be excluded if he bought the
kerosene long before the building burned.
The criminal agency of arson may be proved
by direct, circumstantial or demonstrative
evidence. While direct eyewitnesses to the
crime of arson are rare, careful investigation
may uncover physical, demonstrative proof
such as parts of incendiary devices. While
going through the building the investigator
should be alert to spot fragments of such ap-
paratus and preserve them for later inspection. s
Wicks, candles, boxes that apparently burned
from the inside, groups of string leading from
16 The records of the local weather bureau may
help to establish this fact.
17 WIGMOE, EVIDENcE (ST D NT TExTBooK)
§ 21 (1935).
18 The admissibility of experiments made out of
court with these devices is largely discretionary with
the trial court. It is essential to the validity of the
test that it be made under the same conditions that
existed at the time of the fire. State v. Harris, 100
N.J.L. 184, 124 Atl. 602 (1924). Furthermore, evi-
dence of the experiment will not be admitted with-
out some other proof that the means used in the
experiment were actually employed to start the
fire. Hookerv. State, 98 Md. 145, 56 Ath. 390 (1903).
Pieces of an unusual device found at the scene should
satisfy the latter requirement.
a central place, and even out-of-place docks
may be the key to discovering that such a
device was used.
When the fire is started without a mecha-
nism-which is becoming more frequent--or
the building is completely gutted, the only
evidence of an intentionally set fire may be
circumstantial. Notwithstanding attempts to
disqualify circumstantial evidence or evidence
that tends to show the guilt as proof of the
corpus delicti (discussed later in greater detail),
courts will look to all conditions surrounding
the fire for evidence of a criminal design.
Preparation by the accused, such as his pur-
chase of inflammable materials" or his prior
removal of furniture or inventory,2u are in-
dicative of a planned fire. Suspicious conduct
during or after the fire, like attempted flight
or false statements, has also been considered
evidence of the crime.Y Proof of threats show-
ing a desire for revenge,22 another crime that
the defendent wishes to cover by burning the
building,23 or the opportunity to profit from
the fireu are indications of motive that tends
to prove the fire was intentional. Physical
aspects of the fire may also point to an in-
cendiary burning. Thus, testimony that there
were simultaneous, independent fires in differ-
ent parts of the building 2" or that furniture
was arranged so as to impede the work of
firemen, are circumstances which help to
establish the corpus delicti.
One of the strongest circumstances indicating
an incendiary fire is the presence of highly in-
" State v. O'Hagen, 124 Minn. 58, 144 N.W. 410
(1913).
2 State v. Berkowitz, 325 Mo. 519, 29 S.W.2d
150 (1930).
2L Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31
A.2d 155 (1943) (homicide).
2 State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl. 483 (1889).
2Although the prosecution may not introduce
evidence of other crimes to establish the defendant's
bad reputation, he may show a contemporaneous
crime as proof of motive. State v. McCall, 131 N.C.
798, 42 S.E. 894 (1902).
24 CuRTIss, THE LAW OF ARso § 486 at 532
(1936).
2" State v. Cox, 264 Mo. 408,175 S.W. 50 (1915);
State v. Snyder, 146 Wash. 391, 263 Pac. 180 (1928).
19541
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flammable material where it is not usually
kept.26 This may be shown by physical,
demonstrative evidence if tangible traces of
the substance are discovered.27 Highly com-
bustible material is often found around the
place of greatest burning or where the fire
burned in streaks; a chemical analysis of the
building material in these areas may reveal
inflammable substances even if all outward
signs are burned.28 If all traces are consumed
by the fire it may be possible to prove their
use by circumstantial evidence. Inspection of
the ruins may uncover considerable surface
singeing or show that the fire radiated from a
point that should not have burned more than
the rest of the building. Testimony of people
who observed the fire is frequently relied upon
to establish that the fire burned in a manner
peculiar to "boosted" fires or with various
indications of the presence of inflammables.
Opinion Evidence. A limitation upon the
use of testimonial evidence is the common law
rule that the ordinary witness may testify
only about the facts he observed, not the con-
clusions he drew from them. This rule is some-
times relaxed if the witness first relates enough
facts upon which he could reasonably base an
opinion and it is clear that he cannot describe
the way things appeared to him at the time.28
An expert witness, with special training and
experience, may be permitted to express an
opinion, if the court is satisfied that he is
qualified to aid the jury to interpret data that
they would have great difficulty understand-
ing. 8
Applying these principles to the corpus
delicti of arson, the courts have rarely per-
mitted any witness to give an opinion about
the cause of the fire because they feel that the
26 State v. Goldman, 166 Minn. 292, 207 N.W.
627 (1926).
27 People v. Gilyard, 134 Cal. App. 184, 25 P.2d
35 (1933).
28 Courts will frequently take judicial notice of
the inflammable qualities of matter so this need not
be proved at trial. State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307
(1883).
287 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1924 (3d ed. 1940).
30 7 id. § 1923.
jury is capable of drawing its own conclusions.2 '
However, witnesses have been allowed to ex-
press opinions about matters that indirectly
indicate that the fire was intentionally set,
such as the conclusion that several fires that
were observed started independently. 2 Simi-
larly people who saw the fire may testify that
it burned with unusual intensity for that type
of structure, 33 or that there was heavy smoke
similar to what they had seen at other fires
where there had been oil,M or that they noticed
an odor that they identify as an inflammable
material.-' If technical investigations are con-
ducted to discover facts such as the arrange-
ment of materials to facilitate rapid burning,
it would seem that the expert who made the
examination should be permitted to state his
opinion about these facts. 6
SPECIAL CORPUS DELICTI RULES
Circumstantial Evidence. Frequently the
courts have been impressed with the gravity
of conviction when it is not certain that a
crime was committed, and special rules govern-
ing the proof of the corpus delicti were sug-
gested. The first of these was the requirement
that the crime could only be shown by direct,
eyewitness evidence, even if the surrounding
circumstances were relevant. A few English
authorities attempted to establish this rule
but it was soon repudiated in that country.
7
31 Beneks v. State, 208 Ind. 317, 196 N.E. 73
(1935).
4 People v. Saunders, 13 Cal. App. 743, 110 Pac.
825 (1910).
a State v. Lytle, 214 Minn. 171, 7 N.W.2d 305
(1943); State v. Director, 113 Ore. 74, 231 Pac. 191
(1924).
4 State v. McTague, 190 Minn. 449, 252 N.W.
446 (1934); Pozil v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 244, 283
S.W. 846 (1926).
35 Thomason v. State, 71 Tex. Crim. 439, 160
S.W. 359 (1913).
36 State v. Gore, 152 Kan. 551, 106 P.2d 704
(1940). But the cases on expert opinions are in such
conflict that the National Board of Fire Under-
writers warn against their use. SUGGESTIONS FOR
ARSON INVESTIGATORS 25 (1948).
37 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2081 at 417-22 (3d
ed. 1940).
[Vol. 45
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All American jurisdictions allow circumstantial
evidence as proof of the corpus delicti of arson. 38
At least one court has suggested that while it
was not a strict legal requirement, direct
evidence would be requested whenever it was
possible to obtain it.- This is the practice
that competent prosecutors should follow
whether the courts demand it or not.A
Order of Proof and Separateness. Another
rule that was urged upon early American courts
was the requirement that the corpus delicti
be proved before linking the crime to the
defendant.41 In connection with the order of
proof, the courts considered the rule that there
must be separate evidence of the corpus
delicti and guilt. Under the latter limitation,
evidence that tends to demonstrate the de-
fendant's guilt could not be used to establish
the corpus delicti.42 It is difficult to evaluate
the extent to which these rules were accepted
but they were frequently suggested by counsel
and appear in numerous dicta.43
Courts are now aware that it is often impos-
sible to find evidence of a crime that does not
also point to the guilt of the accused. Thus
modern courts, while recognizing that there
may be some danger of improper conviction
when proof of guilt and the corpus delicti are
intermingled, hold that these rules should not
be strictly applied. Trial courts are given
wide discretion in the use and order of
38 7 id. at 422-3. Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181,
27 N.E. 244 (1894); Thompson v. State, 171 Tenn.
156, 101 S.W.2d 464 (1937).
9 United States v. Williams, 1 Cliff. 5, 20 (U.S.
1858).
40 Suggested by Dean Wigmore, 7 WIGMORE, op.
cit. supra note 37, at 422 n.8.
41 This procedure has received some approval. 1
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 356 at 461 (12th ed.
1932); Carlton v. People, 150 ill. 181, 37 N.E. 244,
245 (1894); Gay v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 450, 60
S.W. 771, 773 (1901).
42 See discussions in State v. Millneier, 102 Iowa
692, 72 N.W. 275, 277 (1897); State v. Jacobs, 2
R.I. 259, 43 At. 31, 32 (1899).
43 Apparently the rule that there must be entirely
separate evidence of the corpus delicti was never
accepted by the courts, and the order of proof was
merely dicta. 68 A. L. R. 78-9 (1903).
evidence.M As a consequence, evidence that
connects the defendant with the crime may
now be admitted before the corpus delicti is
firmly established. 45 Also, evidence that tends
to show who committed the act may be con-
sidered as proof of the corpus delicti.48 The
historical rules, if they ever were widely ac-
cepted, have been effectively discarded.
ExTRA-JuDIcL.. CONuEsssONS
Most of the cases in which the proof of the
corpus delicti is challenged involve the use of
extra-judicial confessions. Although it is strong
evidence that a crime has been committed, a
confession violates all the suggested historical
restrictions upon the proof of the corpus
delicti: it necessarily indicates the guilty party
while establishing the crime, and, in the nar-
row sense, is merely circumstantial evidence
that there has been one. Furthermore, courts
distrust extra-judicial confessions; they are
suspicious of the accuracy with which confes-
sions are reported and the circumstances under
which they are procured. For these reasons
more limitations have been placed upon the
use of confessions than other types of evidence.
Requirement of Corroboration. Two methods
have been developed to control the overzealous
use of confessions. First, confessions obtained
44 While the courts may intermingle the evidence,
they may also decline to do so. Some cases have indi-
cated that the courts may distinguish between the
type of crimes in which the evidence of the corpus
delicti is frequently interwoven from others in
which the proof is normally separate. State v.
Brink, 68 Vt. 659, 35 At. 492, 493 (1896). Other
cases have indicated that it would be appropriate
to adhere to a strict order of proof if the offered evi-
dence has little relevancy to the corpus delicti but
is highly inflammatory toward the accused. People
v. Hall, 48 Mich. 53, 12 N.W. 665, 666 (1882).
45 Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298, 301
(1897); State v. Alcor, 7 Idaho 599, 64 Pac. 1014,
1916-7 (1901); 1 WHLARTON, op. cit. supra note 41,
§ 356.
48 Peoplev. Fitzgerald, 359 Ill. 363, 194 N.E. 545,
549 (1935); State v. Jacobs, 2 R.I. 259, 43 At]. 31
(1899); Pottman v. State, 259 Wisc. 234, 47 N.W.2d
884, 888 (1951); CuRTiss, TnE LAW o ARSON § 486
n.48-9 (1936).
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by undue coercion are inadmissible.4 7 Second,
even when they are not thus excluded, almost
all courts follow the rigid rule that extra-
judicial confessions, as a matter of law, do
not sustain the burden of proving criminal
charges unless corroborated by other inde-
pendent evidence.48 The latter rule is an addi-
tional safeguard against the improper use of
confessions in all cases, and particularly pro-
tects defendants who cannot procure evidence
that they confessed under pressure when such
was actually the case; it may also prevent
punishing willing confessors to non-existent
crimes.n
There is some difference of opinion as to
what matters must be shown by the corroborat-
ing evidence. Most jurisdictions demand that
it go to the corpus delicti and are not satisfied
47 Generally, state courts exclude confessions if
they were involuntarily given under circumstances
that cast doubt upon their trustworthiness. Com-
ment, Admissibiliy of Confessions Under State and
Federal Standards, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 423 (1952).
But the federal courts have discarded the "trust-
worthiness" test and exclude confessions if certain
"civilized standards" of arraignment and interroga-
tion are not met. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in
the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV.
442 (1948).
48 7 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2071 (3d ed. 1940);
127 A. L. R. 1130 (1940). But the distinction be-
tween the defendant's admissions and independent
evidence is not always clear. Note, Corpus Delicti
and Common Gambler's Stalutle, 22 U. OF CiN. L.
REV. 250 (1953). There is an indication that the
strict requirement of corroboration is being worn
away by lowering the standards of confirmation.
Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d
155 (1943), Note, 29 VA. L. REV. 1070. A few
jurisdictions require no corroboration. Common-
wealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468
(1947).
49 On the whole Dean Wigmore believes that the
willing confessor does not present a great danger.
7 WiGMaoRE, op. cit. supra note 48, at 395. But see
WIGMORE, SCINcE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 273-7 (3d
ed. 1937); BEST, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND EVIDENCE
§ 560-73 (3d ed. 1908).
50 Tabor v. United States, 152 F.2d 254 (4th Cir.
1945); Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556
(1949); Vines v. State, 118 Ga. 320 (1903).
with merely additional evidence of guilt.50
While the reasoning behind this rule is not
particularly compelling, most courts apparently
fear that there may be many facts that throw
suspicion upon the accused whether there has
been a crime or not;5' once an actual crime is
shown they feel that a confession is a suffi-
ciently reliable proof of guilt. A few courts
hold that the requirement of corroboration
may be satisfied by any evidence that tends
to produce confidence in the confession.5 2
Regardless of which view is adopted as to
what the corroborations must show, the crucial
question is how much proof other than a con-
fession is sufficient to warrant conviction.53
Under the strictest rule there must be enough
independent evidence so that the jury, with-
out referring to the confession, could be con-
vinced of the corpus delicti beyond a reason-
able doubt.- Most courts hold that while
there must be some corroboration it need not
be conclusive.-r The standard is variously
stated as sufficient evidence to "create a
probability of a crime", or "clear and cogent"
or "prima facie" evidence of the corpus de-
licti8 6 These are merely the standards for
judicial review, however, for the jury must
ultimately be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that a crime has been committed.57
Confessions and the Special Corpus Delicti
Riles. While the common practice is to require
51 For example, these courts are dubious of cor-
roboration by showing that death occurred in the
manner confessed, when this could have been
learned by anyone prior to the confession, people v.
Shanks, 201 N.Y.NMisc. 511, 108 N.Y.S.2d 504
(1951); Note, 3 SYR. L. REV. 368 (1952).
52 Anderson v. United States, 124 F.2d 58, 65-6
(6th Cir. 1941).
1 For legal arguments that this is the crucial
question see, Note, Corpus Delicti--Extra-Judicial
Confessions, 11 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 501 (1950).
54 Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31
A.2d 155, 157 (1943).
51 Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.
1937), 7 U. OF KAN. C. L. REv. 62 (1938).
56 Hays v. State, 214 Miss. 83, 58 So. 2d 61
(1952); Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 So. 46(C
(1922).
5- 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2073 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 45
